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Title: Tackling Corruption in Bangladesh: A Sectoral Study 
 
Abstract 
 
Bangladesh has had a troubled political history since gaining independence in 1971 and is 
also beleaguered by poverty and natural environmental disasters. In particular however, 
corruption is blighting its prospects for economic growth, undermining the rule of law, 
and damaging the legitimacy of the political process. This paper adopts a sectoral 
approach to the study of corruption by examining people’s experiences of using health 
and education services in Bangladesh through a large scale quantitative survey. It also 
presents case study research which assesses the impact of anti-corruption work by 
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) in the areas of health and education. The 
paper concludes that: the poorest in Bangladesh are most penalised by corruption; there 
are significant benefits for health and education service users resulting from TIB’s 
interventions; and there is a need for committed political leadership beyond the period of 
the current caretaker government if ongoing efforts to tackle corruption are to be effective 
and sustainable. 
 
Key words: Bangladesh; corruption; Transparency International; public services. 
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Background 
 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, became an independent 
state after the civil war of 1971. It is a densely populated South Asian country with some 
160m people who commonly experience natural disasters in the form of floods and 
cyclones in the flat land and delta of rivers on the Bay of Bengal. Poverty is widespread 
with GDP per head estimated at just $444 in 2006, or almost half the population living on 
less than one dollar per day (Oxford Economics, 2008). Since independence, Bangladesh 
has experienced political turbulence and spent 15 years under military rule until 
democracy was restored in 1991. Continuing unrest has been a major impediment to 
economic growth set alongside the increasing strength of Islamic fundamentalism. 
Politics have been dominated and polarised by the two largest political parties, long-time 
rivals the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The October 
2001 elections produced a BNP victory in the form of a 4-party alliance. The opposition 
party, Awami League, refused to accept the result and from 2001-2006 their attendance at 
Parliament was sporadic, claiming discrimination by the BNP speaker. Violence, political 
strikes/hartals have accompanied the political turmoil. In August 2004, twenty people 
were killed and more than 100 injured in a grenade attack at an Awami League political 
rally. In January 2005 the former finance minister, Shah Kibria, was assassinated along 
with four colleagues and over 70 injured in an attack at an AL rally in Northern 
Bangladesh. Since summer 2006 opposition parties, directed by Awami League claimed 
that the BNP-led government was seeking to manipulate the electoral infrastructure and 
announced in January 2007 a boycott of the general election. The parliamentary elections 
were cancelled.  
On 11
th
 January 2007, the President declared a state of emergency and a reconstituted 
unelected military-backed caretaker government was put in place. The caretaker Prime 
Minister, Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, governs Bangladesh through a number of advisers who, 
inter alia, are carrying out reforms to the electoral system in preparation for a poll to elect 
a new democratic government. This has resulted in some 12 million duplicate, deceased 
or bogus names being removed from the electoral register. Under the constitution, 
executive power rests with the caretaker government until a prime minister heading a new 
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administration is sworn in following a parliamentary election. Foreign governments are 
keen to see emergency rule lifted and the restoration of full constitutional rights amidst 
reports of human rights abuses and mass arrests. August 2008 witnessed signs of a return 
to an elected government in the first round of local mayoral elections.  The Election 
Commission hopes to hold a parliamentary election in December 2008. However, given 
the delay in formal talks between the Commission and the main political parities, the date 
of the election could be pushed back to 2009. Despite the introduction of a range of 
electoral reforms, the election is expected to be fought between the two largest political 
parties. The dysfunctional two-party system therefore looks set to continue in 
Bangladesh. The two major obstacles to economic progress in Bangladesh are 
lawlessness and corruption. 
Corruption in Bangladesh 
Corruption has been defined as ‘behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a 
public role, because of private-regarding pecuniary or status gains (personal, family, 
private clique)’ (Nye, 1967:419). This behaviour includes bribery, nepotism and 
misappropriation of public funds.  Other definitions include: the misuse of public office 
for personal gain (Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa and Parris, 2000), and the abuse of public 
office for ‘private economic gain’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 75), although all three 
definitions erroneously suggest that corruption is limited to the public sector. 
Notwithstanding definitional nuances, its impact is widely acknowledged as harmful. As 
Heineman and Heimann have argued: 
 
 The true impact of corruption is now widely acknowledged: corruption distorts 
markets and competition, breeds cynicism among citizens, undermines the rule of 
law, damages government legitimacy, and corrodes the integrity of the private 
sector. It is also a major barrier to international development – systemic 
misappropriation by kleptocratic governments harms the poor (Heineman and 
Heimann, 2006: 115). 
 
Bracking (2007: 5) provides a comprehensive summary of the different types of 
corruption as follows: 
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 Administrative or bureaucratic corruption: elicit payments required from users by 
civil servants in the (often distorted and arbitrary) implementation of existing 
regulations, policies and laws. 
 Petty corruption: refers to these small acts, or rent-taking actions, by civil 
servants. Bribery, influencing, and gift giving are sometimes seen as different 
forms of petty corruption. 
 Graft: involves the utilisation of public resources to serve individual or private 
interests. 
 Influencing: forcing a decision in one’s favour. 
 Political corruption: often conflates with grand or high-level corruption: the 
misuse of entrusted power by political leaders. More specific meaning is 
corruption within the political or electoral process. 
 Political patronage (clientelism) and nepotism: government resources are directed 
to patrons, clients, family or ethnic clan of office holders 
 High-level corruption: the misuse of high office, public resources or public 
responsibility for private, personal or group, gain. 
 State capture: private payments to public officials, and the ‘capture’ of their area 
of jurisdiction, in order to affect laws, rules, decrees, regulations or capture 
resources, for example, contracts. 
 
The pervasiveness of corruption in Bangladesh is evidenced by Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI ranks countries, according to 
Transparency International, by ‘their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by 
expert assessments and opinion surveys’. The results on a scale of 0 – 10 (1 = highly 
corrupt; 10 = highly clean) show Bangladesh at the bottom of the list for 5 successive 
years from 2001 – 2005 (with a corruption index score of 1.7 in 2005). In 2006 and 2007 
Bangladesh records a marginal improvement with a corruption index score of 2.0 
(Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2007). Although there has 
been criticism of the validity of this index (Sík, 2002), not least because it is measuring 
perceived rather than actual corruption, Ivanov (2007: 33) sees its value more ‘about 
public relations than about scientific measurement’ which is used by Transparency 
International to ‘rally support for anti-corruption’. Data from worldwide governance 
indicators also show Bangladesh unfavourably.  
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Figure 1 shows the percentile rank of Bangladesh measured on one (of six) dimensions of 
governance used by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, M.: 2008). The 
‘control of corruption’ indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by élites and private interests. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries 
worldwide that rate below these countries. Higher values indicate better governance 
arrangements. In the case of Bangladesh therefore, only 9.7% of countries rate worse on 
the control of corruption in 2007.  
 
The literature 
 
There is a limited literature on the specific problems of corruption in Bangladesh despite 
its pervasiveness. What literature does exist tends to focus on political corruption. Akuter 
(2001), for example, examined electoral corruption before and after independence from 
Pakistan in 1971 comparing the part played by various governments (military, civilian 
and non-partisan caretaker regimes) in overseeing elections. His work explored the 
significant impact which electoral corruption had on the process of democratisation in 
Bangladesh. Khan (2005) considered political and administrative corruption in 
Bangladesh and catalogued an extensive widespread abuse of power and position by 
politicians and civil servants in the absence of proper accountability mechanisms and 
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prevalence of self-seeking behaviour (see also Younis & Mostafa, 2000). He argued that 
corruption is all-pervasive in Bangladesh, ‘so strong and sustained is the influence of 
corruption that most people have come to accept it as a fait accompli. Not only have 
citizens accepted it as a part of their daily life experiences but more frighteningly, they 
feel powerless to address the phenomenon at any level’ (Khan, 2005, 19).  Ahmad (2005) 
argued that checks on corruption are possible through strong political commitment, a 
comprehensive and independent Anti-Corruption Commission, transparency of decision 
making, enforcement of accountability and civil society vigilance. Zakiuddin (2006: 17) 
highlighted the disproportionate impact which political corruption exerts on the lives of 
people in Bangladesh. He argued: 
 
 Although corruption in any form is undesirable, it appears to be less acceptable 
when the state is corrupt. This is partly because the state presumes upon the 
membership and loyalty of its citizens – something which a private body does not 
(cannot) assume. Consequently, because the state has a special position, and is 
regarded to be neutral, impartial, and a representative body which provides for 
and protects the rights of people, any perversion of this understanding is regarded 
to be far more serious than if the same act were carried out by a private body. 
 
Quah (2005) in an edited collection examined how governments responded to both 
political and administrative corruption in selected countries, one of which was 
Bangladesh. Specifically in his work on (mainly South East) Asian countries he argued 
that curbing corruption is difficult mainly because of lack of political will – however ‘it is 
not an impossible dream’ (Quah, 2006: 176). He suggested the most effective approach is 
the impartial implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption laws by a specific anti-
corruption agency, supported by strong political leadership. 
 
Ahmad and Brookins (2004) analysed and compared various newspaper reports on 
corruption in 3 south Asian countries (India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) to discern the 
nature and patterns of corruption and to understand actions taken to combat it. They 
found that Bangladesh had more ‘coercive corruption, with countervailing actions 
dominated by direct actions of victims. In India and Sri Lanka, corruption was generally 
collusive, with countervailing actions on behalf of victims frequently leading to legal 
actions and investigative reports’ (Admad and Brookins, 2004: 29). Admad (2002) has 
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also conducted an empirical analysis of 43 countries (including Bangladesh) on the 
relationship between government regulations and corruption and concluded that 
government regulations spawn corruption up to a certain threshold level, after which they 
can be used to reduce corruption. Most of the literature on Bangladesh therefore tends to 
report on political and high-level corruption with little research on petty corruption 
although Kashem (2005), as part of an edited international collection on policing, 
examined what he described as the ‘social organisation of police corruption’ in 
Bangladesh. He explored the circumstances under which corruption can flourish and its 
consequences for individual safety and freedom as well as security, economy and 
sovereignty of Bangladesh. 
 
Moving beyond the specific confines of Bangladesh, the research for this paper is located 
in three areas of the literature (two of which are substantive and one methodological). 
First, Ivanov (2007) is critical of the global anti-corruption agenda and its associated 
universal diagnosis of the problem and calls for a move away from a global campaign 
against corruption which is devoid of local context. He argues that ‘a more contextualised 
analysis of corruption as a social construct could inform more successful policies’ 
because corruption is a ‘value-ridden concept that should not be treated as though it were 
essentially the same phenomenon around the world’ (Ivanov, 2007: 42).   
 
Second, Spector (2005), drawing on Kaufmann’s work (2003), argued that conventional 
approaches to fighting corruption (passing laws, creating new institutions, and conducting 
anti-corruption campaigns) have not significantly impacted on corruption or reducing 
state capture. Spector (2005) poses the question ‘is corruption in government incurable?’ 
He suggests not, and argues there is evidence that anti-corruption reforms which have 
targeted particular programmes and sectors have made a difference: 
 
 One of the best ways to understand the spread of corruption and what can be done 
to control it, is by analysing its impact sector-by-sector. International experience 
has demonstrated that broad anti-corruption programs may have positive, though 
short-terms, effects on the problem while raising public awareness. However, 
programs that are targeted at vulnerable sectors (i.e. the education and health 
areas) can take hold and be sustained over the longer term (Spector, 2005: 6). 
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In short, he claims that an approach which analyses corruption on a sector-by-sector basis 
and helps identify concrete initiatives, is more likely to have an impact.  As an example 
of sector-specific corruption in developing countries, Vian (2005) examines corruption in 
health care provision arguing that it is government’s role to promote equitable access to 
services, sustainable finance for health objectives, and the prevention of the spread of 
disease. In many cases, she contends, government failure is linked to corruption in health 
care which is particularly vulnerable because of the diversity of services, the scale and 
expense of procurement, and the nature of health care demand. Vian (2005: 59) concludes 
that ‘much of the corruption found in the health sector is a reflection of general problems 
of governance and public sector accountability’.  
 
In a similar vein, Chapman (2005) argues that national education systems across 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable to pervasive corruption. This is because: 
its delivery structures down to community level make it attractive to patronage and 
manipulation; there are a number of significant gatekeepers at each level (district 
education officers, headmasters/mistress and teachers); and, education funding is spent 
across multiple sites resulting in weak monitoring and accounting systems. Chapman 
concludes that ‘corruption is not inevitable and is not a life sentence for a country or 
government’ - the key factor influencing the level of corruption is the quality of top 
leadership. Leaders, he contends, ‘who respect the rule of law, emphasise transparency in 
the operation of the offices they oversee, take actions against subordinates found 
violating rule, and exhibit integrity in their own transactions can make a difference’ 
(Chapman, 2005: 71).  Azfar (2005: 211) arrived at similar conclusions in an economic 
study of health and education in developing countries where he found that ‘corruption 
does in fact undermine the delivery of health and education services and that increasing 
accountability reduces corruption’. 
 
The third area of the literature which informs this paper is the methodological approach 
to researching corruption. Doig, McIvor and Theobald (2006) call for convergence in the 
way we assess the progress and impact of the development agenda in reducing 
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corruption.  These scholars examine both quantitative (e.g. Transparency International’s 
corruption perception index and World Bank governance indicators) and qualitative or 
‘descriptors’ approaches (National Integrity System country studies1) used in corruption 
research. They highlight the deficiencies in each and suggest a convergence: 
 
 For the quantitative approach to provide an effective framework within which to 
consider the progress of development, it must avoid a narrow linear path toward a 
specific objective or destination… Descriptors, on the other hand, may provide 
the analytical framework, as well as the insights into nuances and underlying 
trends relating to, for example, the exercise of political power… How the 
convergence of the two approaches may be sequenced, however, is only now 
being developed (Doig, McIvor and Theobald, 2006: 248 & 249). 
 
Taking into account these three areas of the literature, this paper will:  
 
(a) Analyse people’s actual experiences (as opposed to perceptions) of corruption at 
grassroots level in using key public services in the health and education sectors in 
Bangladesh. 
(b) Consider how Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) is trying to tackle 
abuse in these sectors and the impact of their work on petty corruption in health 
and education services. 
(c) Draw some conclusions on the sectoral approach to tackling corruption in 
Bangladesh.  
 
In considering these issues, the paper attempts in methodological terms to adopt a 
convergent approach of the type described above by Doig, McIvor and Theobald (2006). 
 
 
Experiences of corruption in education & health 
 
One of the key areas of interest here is the extent of corruption in the delivery of core 
public services, those seen as fundamental to the day-to-day lives of Bangladesh people. 
For the purposes of this paper we therefore examine people’s direct experience as service 
users in the health and education sectors. Education is seen as a basic right of citizens and 
an investment in human capital if Bangladesh is to improve its economy and enhance the 
quality of people’s lives. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh 
(article 15) states: It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through 
planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a steady 
improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view to 
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securing for its citizens: the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, 
clothing, shelter, education and medical care. The Government of Bangladesh is therefore 
tasked to provide education and health care services to all citizens particularly the 
disadvantaged groups, such as the poor, women and children. But the quality of education 
and health services is inferior. 
 
The data set used to investigate direct experiences of education and health service users 
in this paper is a 5,000 household interview probability survey selected across 52 districts 
(out of 64) within the 6 divisions of Bangladesh. A three stage stratified cluster sampling 
method was used to select households: primary sampling units or Mauzas were randomly 
selected from each strata; a block of 200 households was randomly selected from each 
primary sampling unit; and 20 households were selected systematically for interview. The 
survey was conducted in June to July 2007 and probed questions on corruption in the 
previous 12 month period.  
 
The key findings from the survey were: 
 
 Overall 66.7% of households experienced corruption in their interactions with 
different public service providers. 
 Corruption is pervasive in Bangladesh and remains unabated with no significant 
difference between 2006 and 2007 
 42.1% of households paid bribes for receiving services from different sectors, an 
average of Taka 4134 per household or Taka 861 per capita (about 60$ and 12.5$ 
respectively). 
 Bribery represents 3.84% per capita income  
 (Transparency International, 2008a). 
 
We consider people’s experiences of education and health services more specifically. 
 
Education 
 
Data from the survey revealed that 72.6% of respondents (n = 3,629) had used education 
services in the previous 12 months. This level of service usage represented the highest 
interaction with services examined in the survey which included: education, electricity, 
health, NGOs, banking, tax, land administration, local government, law enforcement, and 
the judiciary. In terms of the experiences of service users, 34.7% of them had 
encountered corruption in education under various guises: bribery, negligence of duties, 
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nepotism, embezzlement, or deception. The breakdown of these figures is shown in figure 
2. 
Figure 2: Corruption in Education (n = 1260)
Negligence
51%
Embezzlement
21%
Bribe
20%
Deception
1%
Nepotism
7%
 
 
 
The largest form of corruption in the experience of users was negligence of duties by 
teachers involving such things as: poor time keeping, irregular classes (absenteeism), 
delays in releasing exam results, and lack of interest and motivation by teachers in their 
jobs. 
 
To further understand which factors influence/predict corruption in the education sector 
in Bangladesh, we conducted logistic regressions. We were interested in finding out 
which variables predict the likelihood of education service users paying bribes (as one 
element of corruption). In this case we selected the categorical dependent variable and 
predictor variables as follows: 
 
Survey question: Did you pay a ‘donation’ or bribe for admission to education 
services?  
 
Categorical dependent variable: 
Paybribe: Did you pay a donation or bribe for admission?  
 
Predictor variables: 
Toincome: total household income per month.  
Locate: area/location of respondents. 
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Sex: gender of the respondent.  
Type: type of institution (government/non-government & private). 
Time: regularity and timeliness of teachers.  
Tutor: Respondent’s children attend their teachers as a private tutor.  
Addben: Additional benefits gained (prior sight of exam papers & additional marks).  
 
The results are shown in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a significant value (p<.05) and the Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test supports the conclusion that the model is a good fit (chi square value 
 
Table 1: Did you pay a ‘donation’ or bribe for admission to education services?  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
           
SEX 2.267 1.229 4.403 1 .045 
TYPE .400 .893 .200 1 .654 
TIME .871 .930 .879 1 .349 
TUTOR -2.382 1.062 5.029 1 .025 
LOCATE .622 1.057 .347 1 .556 
TOINCOME .000 .000 4.435 1 .042 
ADDBEN -1.079 1.671 .417 1 .519 
Constant -1.237 2.493 .246 1 .620 
  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
    Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 17.807 7 .013 
Block 17.807 7 .013 
Model 17.807 7 .013 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 4.654 7 .702 
 
Model Summary 
 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 39.898(a) .277 .426 
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of 4.654 and p>.05). The model summary statistics indicate that between 27.7% and 
42.6% of the variability in the dependent variable is explained by this set of predictor 
variables. The Wald test shows that three variables contribute significantly to the 
predictive ability of the model (significance <.05): whether children employ their 
teachers as private tutors; the total household income of the family; and the gender of the 
victim of corruption.  The results suggest that those who paid a bribe at admission are: 
less likely to employ private tutors; are from lower income groups; and males (probably 
as the head of household). We now turn to people’s experiences of health care in 
Bangladesh. 
 
Health 
 
The survey data showed that 44.7% of respondents (n = 2,234) had used health services 
in the previous 12 months. In terms of their experiences as service users, 41.8% of them 
had encountered corruption in education under various guises: bribery, negligence of 
duties, nepotism, embezzlement, or deception. The breakdown of these figures is shown 
in figure 3 where bribery and negligence are the highest forms of corruption experienced 
by health service users. These will take the form of: doctors charging for writing 
prescriptions; referring patients to their private clinics; and having to pay extra fees for 
pathological tests in government health facilities. 
 
 
Figure 3: Corruption in Health (n = 934)
Nepotism
1%
Negligence
43%
Bribe
52%
Deception
2%
Embezzlement
2%
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To further understand which factors influence/predict corruption in the health sector in 
Bangladesh, we conducted logistic regressions. We were interested in finding out which 
variables predict the likelihood of health service users paying bribes (as one element of 
corruption). In this case we selected the categorical dependent variable and predictor 
variables as follows: 
 
Survey question: Did you paid any extra money (excluding fees) for hospital 
treatment?  
Categorical dependent variable: 
Paybribe: Did you pay any extra money for hospital treatment?  
 
Predictor variables: 
Toincome: total household income per month. 
Locate: area location of respondents.  
Sex: gender of the respondent.  
Private: advised to go to private clinic.  
Diagnose: doctors press you to go to a certain diagnostic centre.  
Prescrip: paid money for prescription.  
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The results are shown in table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The omnibus tests of model coefficients show a significant value (p<.0005) and the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test supports the conclusion that the model is a good fit (chi 
square value of 7.852 and p>.05). The model summary statistics indicate that between 
10% and 16% of the variability in the dependent variable is explained by this set of 
predictor variables (this is a lower level of explanation than the education model above). 
The Wald test shows that two variables contribute significantly to the predictive ability of 
 
Table 4: Did you paid any extra money (excluding fees) for hospital treatment?  
 
Variables in the Equation 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
      
PRESCRIP 1.758 .398 19.561 1 .000 
DIAGNOSE .666 .396 4.826 1 .043 
PRIVATE .218 .384 .323 1 .570 
TOINCOME .000 .000 .171 1 .679 
LOCATE -.161 .391 .169 1 .681 
SEX .385 .451 .730 1 .393 
Constant -2.180 .550 15.725 1 .000 
  
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 
    Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 26.342 6 .000 
Block 26.342 6 .000 
Model 26.342 6 .000 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 7.852 8 .448 
 
Model Summary 
 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 218.639(a) .100 .160 
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the model (significance <.05): whether the patient pays the doctor for writing a 
prescription; and if the doctors press service users to go to a specific diagnostic centre. 
The results suggest that patients who have to pay extra money for hospital treatment are: 
more likely to be those for whom the doctor must write a prescription; and those who are 
pressed by doctors to go to a certain diagnostic centre. Comparing both education and 
health provision the data indicate that while negligence by professionals in these services 
is a major problem (51% in education and 43% in health), there is much greater 
prevalence of bribery in the health sector (20% in education and 52% in health). We now 
consider how Transparency International Bangladesh, as a major anti-corruption agency, 
is tackling petty corruption in these core services. 
 
 
Tackling petty corruption in education and health 
 
Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) is an accredited national chapter of Berlin-
based Transparency International, a global civil society organisation leading the fight 
against corruption.  TIB began its activities as a trust in 1996, and in 1998 the 
Government of Bangladesh approved its registration as an independent, non-partisan, not-
for-profit, non-governmental organisation. TIB’s vision for Bangladesh is a country in 
which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of its citizens are 
free from corruption. To secure this vision, its mission statement is: 
 
 To catalyse and strengthen a participatory social movement to promote and 
develop institutions, laws and practices for combating corruption in Bangladesh, 
and to establish an efficient and transparent system of governance, politics and 
business (Transparency International Bangladesh, 2007: 8).   
 
The ‘social movement’ operationalises its mission statement through the TIB Making 
Waves project (2003 – 2008). TIB works against corruption, not against the government 
of the day, nor any particular public sector department. As a social movement TIB’s task 
is to create a demand for effective policy reform and institutional change conducive to the 
reduction in corruption. It has no mandate or capacity to investigate or take action against 
individual cases or allegations of corruption, whether large or small. TIB is a co-
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stakeholder and a source of support to initiatives for reducing corruption and establishing 
transparent and accountable governance in Bangladesh including those by Government. 
 
The key mechanisms through which Making Waves impacts on reducing corruption and 
generating accountability in education and health at local level are: committees of 
concerned citizens; volunteer youth groups (youth engagement and support); advice and 
information desks; report cards; and people’s theatre. 
 
Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) are local level watchdogs and a key pillar in 
TIB’s social movement against corruption. The CCCs are groups of citizens with a high 
degree of moral and social standing/credibility who motivate and mobilise citizens in 
various activities designed to curb corruption and promote good governance in public 
services such as education, health and local government. Once the committees are 
formed, they draw up their own programme priorities and annual plan of work. TIB 
provides the technical and financial support in implementing the programmes. Apart from 
various anti-corruption awareness activities, the focus of the CCCs’ watchdog functions 
is normally on improving key public services. Members of the CCCs are committed to 
the values, mission and code of ethics of TIB and work on a fully voluntary and non-
partisan basis. Six Committees of Concerned Citizens were formed in the greater 
Mymensingh area in 2000. Based on their success, another 30 committees were formed in 
July 2006 – in total 36 CCCs are working in 34 districts across all 6 divisions in 
Bangladesh.   
 
Volunteer youth groups of local students/young people (usually aged between 15 – 30 
years and unlimited in numbers) are mobilised and attached to the CCCs. They involve 
themselves in awareness raising activities. By undertaking various tailor-made 
programmes, these young people learn the core values of volunteerism and prepare 
themselves as future leaders of the anti-corruption social movement. They also develop 
the commitment and leadership qualities needed to expand and strengthen the anti-
corruption constituency. The activities of these groups entitled Youth Engagement and 
 19 
Support (YES) include debating competitions, publications, anti-corruption campaigns, 
cycle rallies, human chains against corruption, and cartoon exhibitions.  
 
In addition to the above, there are three mechanisms of note: 
 
(a) Advice and Information Desks (AI desks) provide access to information which is 
key to creating awareness and helping people to resist and become victims of 
corruption. TIB has set up advice and information desks attached to the CCCs and 
in satellite format. Members of the public are provided access to basic information 
and advice on key public services. 
 
(b) Report card surveys are conducted by the CCCs in consultation with local people 
to examine issues which most directly affect their daily lives, typical of which are: 
health, education, land administration and local government. The surveys make an 
assessment of the content and quality of public services provided to local people 
and highlight the nature, process and implications of corruption at local levels. 
Reports are then used to advocate and demand public accountability from service 
providers. 
 
(c) People’s theatre is one of the major advocacy tools of TIB which is used at the 
local level to build awareness against corruption, particularly amongst the most 
vulnerable and illiterate.  
 
Impact on petty corruption 
 
To assess the impact on education and health services we adopted a mixed methods 
approach involving: secondary data analysis; interviews with key stakeholders; field 
work visits to, and case studies of, Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs); and focus 
group work with education and health service users and victims of corruption at case 
study locations. Impact assessments are undertaken to estimate whether or not 
interventions produce their intended effects. In strict methodological terms, determining 
impact requires comparing, with as much rigour as is practicable, the conditions of 
targets/recipients that have experienced an intervention with those of equivalent 
targets/recipients who have not, using quantitative designs such as randomised 
experiments, quasi experiments, before and after studies and so on. Due to the complex 
and often hidden nature of corruption, quantitative methods were ruled out and we relied 
on narrative accounts from providers and users of education and health service in case 
study locations. 
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The selection of the CCC case study locations was a particularly important choice and we 
used the following criteria to inform the process included: length of time CCCs had been 
established; CCCs perceived by TIB to be ‘successful’ through to ‘less successful’; 
gender diversity within CCCs; and an area without a CCC to act as a counterfactual for 
comparison in assessing impact. 
 
The case study areas selected to gather evidence of impact were: 
 
(1) Natore: Natore Sadar Hospital; Moshironnessa Government Primary School; and 
Laksmipur Union Parishad.  
(2) Chapai Nawabgonj: Chapai Nawabgonj Sadar Hospital; Bidirpur Government 
Primary School; and Chapai Nawabgonj Municipality. 
(3) Rajshahi: Rajshahi Municipality, Education Board and School Management 
Committee. 
(4) Gazipur: Gazipur Municipality 
(5) Naogaon: local hospital, primary school and NGO group (control area) 
 
By its nature, a case study approach has inherent methodological weaknesses. The trade-
off in securing depth and richness of qualitative information in 5 case study areas is lack 
of generalisability. That said, the selection of our case study areas was judicious and we 
used secondary data on CCCs which we did not visit to validate our findings. In addition, 
researchers must be careful attributing changes/impacts to an intervention (before and 
after studies) without the benefit of an experimental design approach.  
 
Through the case studies we met with CCC and YES members in all areas (except the 
control area), and a mix of groups ranging across: teachers, school management 
committees and mothers of students, victims of corruption, hospital users and health 
watch groups. We also held meetings directly with health providers, nurses, doctors, civil 
surgeons, school principals and elected representatives in each of the case study areas. 
We summarise the findings from the qualitative data gathered through interviews, focus 
groups and non-participant observation in education and health services.  
 
The Education Sector: The CCCs actively engaged with primary schools in the case 
study areas, a key improvement being the significant number of eligible students now 
enrolled. Student attendance had not been satisfactory and CCCs intervened to address 
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this and other issues. They met with school management committees and guardians, 
organised workshops and promotional campaigns along with awards aimed at 
incentivising attendance. As a result, student enrolments have increased and text books 
are available for free distribution to students. The scholarship pass rate has also 
improved. Teachers, the school management committees and guardians are now jointly 
engaged in providing better education for the children in an accountable and transparent 
way. Teacher attendance and performance in their jobs are being closely monitored by 
CCCs. 
The Health Sector: CCC members and the YES group have worked consistently with 
hospitals in the case study areas to improve health services. They have met with the 
authorities and identified gaps in their provision. They prepared information booklets 
about the nature and types of health care services available which they distributed 
through satellite advice and information desks. In addition, the YES group members have 
organised public theatre shows and exchanged views with people from the hospitals’ 
catchment areas. As a result, there have been some significant developments in health 
provision such as an improvement in the ticketing system. Previously the price of a ticket 
for services in the out-patients department was 4.40 taka, but patients paid 5.00 taka due 
to ‘lack of change’ being available. Now a fund has been created for patients in poverty 
with the extra 60 paisa received from each ticket. 
 
Medicine supplies were also very low. Following the intervention by CCC and YES 
members, supplies have increased and the list of medicines available is on public display. 
The behaviour of doctors, nurses and ancillary staff towards patients has also improved. 
An ambulance service is available for which patients do not make additional payments, 
patients tests are carried out in the pathology departments of the hospitals (as opposed to 
a private clinic) and toilet facilities have been significantly improved. Finally, the issue of 
cleanliness is a higher priority although has still some way to go. Interesting though, the 
control hospital visited was displaying information on prices and medicine in response to 
a Ministry of Health circular requesting this in all hospitals. We summarise the case study 
education and health services before CCC intervention, following intervention and the 
nature of the impacts in table 3. 
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Table 3: Pre and Post Intervention in Health & Education 
 
Services before CCC 
intervention 
Current status –  
CCC intervention 
Impacts 
 
Pre and Post Intervention in Health 
 
 High level of dissatisfaction 
over services of public 
hospitals/health complex 
 Corruption by doctors in 
terms of time spent outside 
hospitals on private work, 
irregular office hours, 
referring patients to his/her 
own private practice or 
specialised diagnostic centres 
 Money charged for free 
services and extra money 
taken for different health 
services by doctors, nurses 
and ancillary ward staff 
 Inadequate medical facilities 
such as beds, operating 
theatres, trolleys and 
ambulances 
 Bribes demanded to issue 
medical certificates 
 Medical representatives in 
doctors’ offices during clinic 
hours 
 Lack of cleanliness and 
hygienic environment 
 Inadequate supply of 
medicines 
 Doctors are coming to 
hospitals on time 
 The availability of doctors 
has increased 
 Information on ticket fees, 
service charges, fees for 
diagnostic tests etc are 
published on notice boards 
 Published notices that 
patients should not pay extras 
for free services 
 Extra money from fees for 
tickets is either deposited to 
welfare fund or returned to 
patients (e.g. Rangpur and 
Kurigram) 
 Cleanliness improved 
 Health officials (surgeons 
and doctors) are now more 
helpful both in terms of 
information transparency and 
gradual improvements in 
health facilities 
 Updated list of medicines, 
and doctors & nurses rota is 
now on display 
 There has been a general 
degree of co-operation 
following the release of the 
report card and ongoing 
engagement with the CCC 
 Key health personnel such as 
the Civil Surgeon, 
superintendent, senior 
medical staff and ancillary 
staff participated in the report 
card press release and 
answered questions from 
journalists 
 The report card findings 
received extensive publicity 
in the media 
 Volunteers of the CCC 
regularly visit hospitals to 
monitor services and ensure 
patients receive the necessary 
support 
 
Pre and Post Intervention in Education 
 
 Extra money collected under 
the guise of various fees 
 Lack of transparency in 
collecting money 
 Anomalies in distributing 
stipends among poor students 
 Teachers reluctant to take 
classes on time and to teach 
allocated class times 
 School Management 
Committee inactive 
 Absence of (or inactive) 
Parents Teachers 
Associations. 
 Education authorities are 
aware of the anomalies 
which exist and have sought 
to address these 
 Teachers’ performance has 
improved including their 
time-keeping and 
maintaining class discipline 
  
 School management 
committees are more active 
and willing to work with 
CCC to improve the quality 
of education services. In 
some areas (such as 
Sunamganj) they did not 
even know each other. 
 Through events like 
Mothers’ Gatherings and 
satellite AI-desks, people 
have become more aware of 
their rights 
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Conclusions 
 
There are a number of conclusions which can be drawn from this two-part study 
comprising a quantitative analysis on people’s direct experiences of corruption in 
education and health services, and a qualitative assessment of the work of Transparency 
International Bangladesh in selected case study areas. 
 
First, the empirical results from the survey highlight the prevalence of petty corruption in 
the delivery of health and education services in Bangladesh – 42% and 35% respectively. 
The incidence of public services corruption in rank order in Bangladesh is: law 
enforcement, local government, land administration, the judiciary, followed by health and 
education (Transparency International, 2008a: 14). In health care those users who are 
most vulnerable to corruption are patients needing a prescription from the doctor and 
those requiring further medical tests who are coerced to attend a private diagnostic centre 
of the doctor’s choice. In education, lower income groups and males are more likely to 
have to pay bribes at admission and, as a consequence, are less likely to need to employ 
private tutors.  These findings broadly reflect the empirical results from the Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2007) which interviewed 63,199 people in 
60 countries (Bangladesh is not included). The barometer study concluded that the poor 
are most penalised by corruption. Reported bribery across regions varied considerably 
and in the Asia-Pacific group of countries 22% of respondents had paid a bribe in the past 
year
2
. This is significantly lower than petty bribery in health and education services in 
Bangladesh. The barometer report concludes that ‘the poorest in all societies are the ones 
hit hardest by bribery. However, as they face the most demands for bribes, they are more 
likely to pay. This, in turn, means that corruption acts as a regressive tax that increases 
income inequality’ (Transparency International, 2007: 13). 
 
Second, the case study evidence on the work of Transparency International Bangladesh 
demonstrates both the tangible impact their work at grassroots level is having and its 
potential as a social movement for expansion. The mobilisation of concerned citizens and 
young people who act as a watchdog over education and health providers has increased 
local accountability and produced a level of financial savings either for reinvestment in 
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public services or a reduction in petty corruption for users. TIB intends to scale-up these 
activities beyond individual schools and hospitals in the next phase of its development 
(Transparency International, 2008b). They will do this by institutionalising ‘integrity 
pacts’ with public bodies as a means of maximising accountability, transparency and 
integrity in the wider public sector. The pact is an agreement between stakeholders under 
which all parties have rights and obligations. Neither side will: abuse entrusted power for 
private gain; pay, offer, demand or accept bribes for services rendered or public contracts 
made or carried out; and, collude with each other including competitors to obtain a 
contract. Any violation will results in sanctions. These grassroots activities operate 
alongside work by TIB at the national level which includes: monitoring and holding to 
account the key pillars of the National Integrity System; diagnostic studies on institutions 
where the level of corruption is perceived to be high; supporting the work of the Anti-
Corruption Commission (set up under the caretaker government in February 2007); and, 
major advocacy campaigns to raise awareness of people’s entitlements to public services.  
 
Finally, an examination of the Bangladesh case attests to key messages from the anti-
corruption literature. This country study lends support to Spector’s thesis (2005) that 
fighting corruption on a sectoral basis is more likely to yield positive results. However it 
does so in a specific context where the decentralised approach adopted by TIB has 
facilitated local accountability of service providers. Quah’s (2006) argument that the 
control of corruption will only be effective if supported by strong political leadership is 
particularly relevant in Bangladesh where its key politicians ( Khaleda Zia (BNP) and 
Sheihk Hasina (AL)) have been jailed on corruption charges, although the latter is in exile 
in America following release on medical parole. Despite the launch of an anti-corruption 
drive by the caretaker government progress has been slow and mired in legal disputes. 
Even with the implementation of electoral reforms, the return of the old guard, eager to 
access public funds after nearly 2 years in the political wilderness, looks inevitable. So 
entrenched is corruption within the two main parties that the work spearheaded by 
Transparency International Bangladesh and the Anti-Corruption Commission may well 
falter. Bracking’s (2007: 23) review of anti-corruption campaigns ends with ‘a call for 
more contextual understandings of the politics and political economy of different 
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countries and areas’. In the politics of Bangladesh, greater democratisation and the return 
of an elected government may ironically reinforce or exacerbate problems of corruption. 
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1
 The concept of the National Integrity System (NIS) has been developed and promoted by Transparency 
International as part of its holistic approach to countering corruption. The NIS consists of the key 
institutions, laws and practices that contribute to integrity, transparency and accountability in a society. 
When it functions properly, the NIS combats corruption as part of the larger struggle against abuse of 
power, malfeasance, and misappropriation in all its forms. The main ‘pillars’ of the NIS are considered to 
be the following: Executive; Legislature; Political Parties; Electoral Commissions; Supreme Audit 
Institution; Judiciary; Public Sector; Police and Prosecutors; Public Procurement; Ombudsman; Anti-
corruption agencies; Media; Civil Society; Private Sector;  Regional and Local Government; and 
International Institutions. Source: Transparency International. 
2
 The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2007) Asia-Pacific countries included: 
Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
